Hours later, Saleh signed the agreement in a richly decorated space, accompanied by members of the Saudi royal family, Yemeni opponents and diplomats. He promised to « cooperate » with the new government, accusing opponents of staging a « putsch ». If the deal holds, it will make Saleh the fourth Arab leader, pushed by power this year by popular uprisings that have rocked the Middle East and North Africa. But the deal does not guarantee that it will restore calm to a nation shattered by 10 months of political instability and suffering from a power vacuum that al-Qaeda-linked groups have exploited with increasing boldness. The UAE welcomed an agreement to settle disputes between the Yemeni government and the Southern Transitional Council (NRC), a new step for the conflicting country. Yemen`s internationally recognized government will only support peace initiatives that correspond to the GCC initiative, the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference and UN Security Council Resolution 2216, official sources told Arab News on Tuesday. The Aden crisis revealed a rift between Saudi Arabia and its main Arab ally, the United Arab Emirates, which began reducing its presence in Yemen in June, when Western allies, including some who provide arms and intelligence to the coalition, insisted an end to a war that has killed tens of thousands. After the Kuwait talks, events took place to call into question the framework of the United Nations. By the end of 2017, the conflict was stalled, leading Yemen`s two main belligerents to turn their attention to their other adversaries, including temporary allies. The Hadi government and its allies came into open conflict with southern separatists, backed by the United Arab Emirates, and with forces allied to the United Arab Emirates in Taiz following a disagreement between Hadi and the Emirates over his government`s close relations with Islah, a Sunni Islamist political party. Who consider the United Arab Emirates as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood that denigrates them. Even with such support from the United States, the deal quickly shook. The Houthis and the government had radically different interpretations of the hastily crafted agreement, which the UN hoped could serve as a basis for common governance and power-sharing, and fought to find the common ground needed to implement a plan to demilitarize Hodeidah and surrounding territory.
as agreed. The Houthis saw the deal as maintaining their control over the port of Hodeidah, while the government saw it as restoring its legitimate sovereignty over the territory. Talks on the exchange of prisoners and a ceasefire in Taiz also found themselves at an impasse. External pressure had been enough to bring the parties to an agreement, but not enough to force their implementation. It remains unclear how the country`s interim leaders will resolve a bitter triple fight between Saleh and two rivals – including a separatist general who commands well-armed defectors – that has recently overshadowed popular protests. In December 2018, Western and international politicians demonstrated something Yemenis had long suspected: if they are motivated by developments on the ground or at home, they can achieve (some) diplomatic results, as the US has done, by putting pressure on Saudi Arabia and thus on Yemen`s internationally recognized government to accept the UN-brokered Stockholm Agreement. . . .